RIG EK at Drops ASN1 Ransomware


Image of Traffic:


Infection Chain:

The true infection chain for this run was circumvented in that I know a couple decoy sites being used by the HookAds malvertising campaign. Normally a user would be browsing a legitimate website and then be redirected to a decoy site through malvertising. The dummy site contains an iframe that redirects the host to the RIG EK infrastructure.

Here is an image of the iframe found on the decoy site:


The domain wrapsing.gdn resolves to The resolution history for is as follows:

Domain First Seen Last Seen
wrapsing.gdn 3/1/2017 4:03 3/1/2017 12:08
chromotor.gdn 2/28/2017 3:53 3/1/2017 8:25
thousales.gdn 2/28/2017 16:08 3/1/2017 2:08
tworotator.info 12/23/2016 10:46 3/1/2017 0:34
threerotator.info 12/23/2016 22:41 3/1/2017 0:19
sapporoads.info 12/23/2016 4:10 2/28/2017 23:39
kagoshimaads.info 12/1/2016 17:10 2/28/2017 22:38 11/29/2016 20:25 2/28/2017 16:41
antinent.gdn 2/28/2017 13:46 2/28/2017 13:46
austribach.gdn 2/23/2017 22:46 2/28/2017 1:54
mormous.gdn 2/25/2017 9:54 2/28/2017 1:39
sebrisburg.gdn 2/24/2017 11:04 2/28/2017 1:39
goverzia.xyz 2/23/2017 10:46 2/27/2017 15:03
requippped.xyz 2/22/2017 23:05 2/27/2017 10:25
neveraged.gdn 2/24/2017 22:56 2/27/2017 2:11
aristinct.xyz 2/22/2017 16:10 2/26/2017 16:33
patteriod.gdn 2/25/2017 16:05 2/26/2017 8:48
vecheers.xyz 2/22/2017 4:02 2/23/2017 12:32
takamatsuads.info 12/2/2016 12:45 2/21/2017 23:55
onerotator.info 11/22/2016 13:33 2/21/2017 22:56
kumamotoads.info 1/3/2017 23:17 2/21/2017 22:19
kitakiyushuads.info 12/2/2016 15:05 2/14/2017 21:15
adsstation.info 2/14/2017 20:06 2/14/2017 20:06
okayamaads.info 11/30/2016 15:16 12/22/2016 17:43
kanazawaads.info 12/2/2016 1:44 12/22/2016 14:20
sendaiads.info 12/2/2016 16:05 12/2/2016 16:14
naraads.info 11/30/2016 15:45 12/1/2016 1:21
nagoyaads.info 11/30/2016 6:25 11/30/2016 18:39
kobeads.info 11/30/2016 17:07 11/30/2016 17:07
osakaads.info 11/29/2016 22:40 11/30/2016 14:40
fukuokaads.info 11/30/2016 5:54 11/30/2016 14:17
kyotoads.info 11/29/2016 13:05 11/30/2016 4:00
tokyoads.info 11/29/2016 11:50 11/29/2016 11:50

The Whois information for is as follows:

WHOIS Server whois.ripe.net
Registrar RIPE NCC
Email abuse@ipipe.net (registrant)
Name HQHost dedicated block (registrant)
Organization hqhost-dedicated-Cl-82 (registrant)
Overoptic Systems LTD DBM (admin)
Overoptic Systems LTD Tech (tech)
Street 13 Freeland Park, Wareham Road (admin, tech)
Postal BH16 6FH Poole (admin, tech)
Country GB (registrant)
Phone 4401202806130 (admin, tech)

The Whois information for wrapsing.gdn is as follows:

WHOIS Server whois.publicdomainregistry.com
Registrar PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com
Email seoboss@seznam.cz (registrant, admin, billing, tech)
Name Robert Bulis (registrant, admin, billing, tech)
Organization N/A (registrant, admin, billing, tech)
Street Lysinska 1756/32
City Praha 12
State Praha
Postal Postal code 14300
Country CZ
Phone 420234261846 (registrant, admin, billing, tech)
Name Servers a8332f3a.bitcoin-dns.hosting

The email address seoboss@seznam.cz and name Robert Bulis is associated with the following 90 domains:

Domain Email Address Registered
germante.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/27/2017
dravitalia.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/27/2017
slightfall.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/27/2017
unexperic.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/27/2017
wallther.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/27/2017
chromotor.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/26/2017
wrapsing.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/26/2017
zachael.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/26/2017
thousales.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/26/2017
sidentitis.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/23/2017
concephall.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/23/2017
havenhoek.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/22/2017
entrary.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/22/2017
discussels.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/22/2017
austribach.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/22/2017
sebrisburg.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/22/2017
neveraged.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/22/2017
patteriod.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/22/2017
rulence.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/22/2017
dispanic.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/22/2017
mormous.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/22/2017
becomple.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/22/2017
explosin.gdn seoboss@seznam.cz 2/22/2017
aristinct.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/25/2017
requippped.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/25/2017
vecheers.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/24/2017
goverzia.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/24/2017
paramework.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/18/2017
erodontain.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/18/2017
afghanas.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/13/2017
matrixial.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/13/2017
orderships.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/12/2017
babbath.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/12/2017
tulsars.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/12/2017
misseum.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/12/2017
accomaya.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/10/2017
maesthe.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/10/2017
becombass.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/10/2017
fissippi.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/10/2017
suggenheim.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/10/2017
parenator.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/10/2017
variedman.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/9/2017
mainful.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/9/2017
moransport.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/9/2017
prairian.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/8/2017
lisborn.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/8/2017
nomalist.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/8/2017
tructive.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/7/2017
summedit.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/7/2017
recenturex.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/2/2017
encumb.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/2/2017
heathbud.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/2/2017
harriving.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/2/2017
chanicate.xyz seoboss@seznam.cz 1/2/2017
oppositive.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/29/2016
philimate.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/29/2016
whimselves.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/29/2016
nebulanti.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/29/2016
doubterror.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/27/2016
immorpha.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/27/2016
maskeletal.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/27/2016
bassacrame.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/27/2016
acireh.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/25/2016
allireva.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/25/2016
evitats.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/25/2016
deyojne.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/25/2016
margoib.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/25/2016
aweeklya.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/24/2016
sustainablea.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/24/2016
identitya.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/24/2016
wholea.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/24/2016
enviroa.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/24/2016
atacano.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/21/2016
craneov.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/21/2016
draegis.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/21/2016
balaurno.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/21/2016
doralda.top seoboss@seznam.cz 12/21/2016
findsilver.top seoboss@seznam.cz 11/29/2016
staycold.top seoboss@seznam.cz 11/29/2016
vertigoads.top seoboss@seznam.cz 11/29/2016
startmedia.top seoboss@seznam.cz 11/29/2016
cometamedia.top seoboss@seznam.cz 11/29/2016
trafficprofit.top seoboss@seznam.cz 11/29/2016
mindflash.top seoboss@seznam.cz 11/29/2016
mediaqboost.top seoboss@seznam.cz 11/29/2016
cozyads.top seoboss@seznam.cz 11/29/2016
wildwildmedia.top seoboss@seznam.cz 11/29/2016
promohoster.pro seoboss@seznam.cz 11/24/2016
alphamedia.pro seoboss@seznam.cz 11/24/2016
bestrotation.pro seoboss@seznam.cz 11/24/2016

All of the domains shown above seem to be using at least one of the following name servers:

  • 1a7ea920.bitcoin-dns.hosting
  • ad636824.bitcoin-dns.hosting
  • a8332f3a.bitcoin-dns.hosting
  • c358ea2d.bitcoin-dns.hosting

The majority of these domains are being categorized as malicious. Another thing to note is that during additional runs I saw the site hickenzi.gdn being used, which resolved to It uses the same name servers as the domains resolving to and had the same registrant email address of seoboss@seznam.cz.

Continuing the investigation… The GET request for wrapsing[.]gdn/rotation/exoclick returns RIG’s pre-filter page, otherwise known as firstDetect.js.html. For example, here is a partial image of the pre-filter page code which contains the URL for the landing page:


This causes the POST request for landing page. Below is a partial image of the landing page:


We then see the GET for the Flash exploit:


Followed by the GET for the malware payload:


The script responsible for the GET is contained within o32.tmp, which is dropped into %Temp% and executed:


The payload deletes itself from %Temp% but is copied to %AppData%:


It also creates a registry entry for persistence at HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun:


Looking at the Hybrid-Analysis report we can see it use the following processes:


We can see it using the command vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet to delete the Shadow Volume Copies from the system. This means users wont be able to recover their files. User’s should take preventative actions and disable the vvsadmin.exe utility. Read more about this at BleepingComputer.com.

We then see a ransom note pop-up on the Desktop:


I’ve never seen this ransom note before but it was identified as ASN1 ransomware by @PolarToffee at https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/837063826436653056.

The infected files weren’t appended with anything and the filenames weren’t altered or obfuscated. I couldn’t find much information on ASN1 but there was a discussion on BleepingComputer.com back on October 21st, 2016, which can be found at the following link: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/630050/asn1-ransomware-key-how-to-use-it/.

We can also see that !!!!!readme!!!!!.htm is dropped in folders containing infected files:

At first glance it doesn’t appear that the media files are infected, however, trying to open the pictures and music didn’t work:

Here is an image of an encrypted file:


Here is an image !!!!!readme!!!!!.htm:


The URL for the personal page contains the following fields in the query string:

  • iso=us
  • dt=nd
  • uid=32 characters
  • pin=3072 characters
  • ref=75ecc763c8aeb325547b1f25bb6de17d (segui.exe.75ecc763c8aeb325547b1f25bb6de17d.exe)
  • bn=7601.18247.x86fre.win7sp1_gdr.130828-1532 (Build version)
  • sn=Windows 7 Home Basic
  • il=192.168.XXX.XXX (Internal IP address)
  • cnt=289

Installing the Tor browser and following the link for my personal page brought me here:


They are charging 0.5 BTC, which currently equals 614.58 USD. There is a two day count down timer until the price is doubled.

The “Download cryptolocker” link shown on the bottom of the personal page downloaded segui.exe.75ecc763c8aeb325547b1f25bb6de17d.exe. The VT and Hybrid-Analysis report for that file can be found at the beginning of this post.

Clicking on “Chat with support” brings the user to a chat page were they can submit one file for decryption:


After submitting a file it took only a minute for it to be returned fully decrypted. However, nobody responded to my various questions.

The wallet address doesn’t show any payments received:


Until next time!


  1. […] 日現在)、その多くが悪意のあるアクティビティにリンクされています。これらにリンクされていることから、この登録者電子メール […]



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